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How to use
Timing attack

A comparison that bails out at the first character that fails leaks, in the TIME it takes, how many characters you got right — without ever saying whether you got it right. Published by Kocher in 1996 against RSA. Here time is SIMULATED as an operation count, never a real clock: browsers deliberately degrade the precision of their clocks since Spectre, so a real measurement would be unreliable and different on every machine.

Power analysis (DPA)

A real cipher leaks, in its power draw, the Hamming weight (how many bits are set) of the data it processes at each instant. With enough measurements, splitting into two groups by a bit predicted for each candidate key and subtracting their means reveals a peak exactly at the correct key. Published by Kocher, Jaffe, and Jun in 1999. Here synthetic traces are generated (never real hardware) over AES's S-box.

Side-channel labAttack a secret by timing and a key by power analysis
Side-channel labReally attack a secret by timing and a key by power analysis. 100% simulated, in your browser

A "server" compares your guess against a hidden secret with the age-old naive comparison: byte by byte, bailing out on the first mismatch. The time it takes — here counted in operations, never a real clock — leaks how many characters you got right, without ever saying whether you got the whole secret.

The hardware thread:the transistor and the CMOS inverterthe clock path and its delayhow that same delay — and that same power draw — turn into an information leak (you are here)